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ABSTRACT: The author holds that the old theory according to which philosophy is the matrix of 
argumentation studies must be entirely reviewed currently. He argues that argumentation theory, as 
an interdisciplinary domain, may start playing, in new terms, the role which ― in the Cartesian tree ― 
was that of philosophy as the trunk of the different branches of human knowledge, as long as a set of 
requirements, which he lists, were met.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
One of the most remarkable particularities of argumentation studies today is that 
they are shared by researchers coming from a wide range of disciplines, including 
philosophy itself: linguistics, speech communication, sociology, legal theory, etc. 
These studies begin, then, by being markedly multidisciplinary. This situation is not 
new in the history of rhetoric and argumentation from the times of classical 
antiquity, but the current situation has historical and (I would say) philosophical 
characteristics that are very unique and to which we should pay very special 
attention. The first of these is that, according to what seems to be the way they are 
generally perceived, these matters are no longer some among so many others in the 
scope of human knowledge, as was thought in the past (until the second half of the 
20th century, at least, and Perelman and Toulmin in particular), but they are 
somehow essential or fundamental; to the degree that, from a certain point of view, 
everything can be interpreted in light of them or from their perspective, they are at 
the core of knowledge itself as a whole. In this multidisciplinary context, philosophy 
itself does not occupy any place of distinction or privilege : it is just one more among 
the various and diverse contributions to the multidisciplinary field of 
argumentation, to that which has come to be commonly referred to as 
"argumentation theory".  
Everything I have just said is generally assumed to be given by those who 
dedicate to the study of argumentation. In Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, 
argumentation study is seen “as a discipline in its own right [note these words] 
nourished by the combined efforts of philosophers, logicians, linguists, (speech) 
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communication specialists, psychologists, lawyers, and others.” (van Eemeren et al., 
1996, p. 12) And Ralph Johnson refers to argumentation theory as a 
“multidisciplinary investigation” that involves these and other areas (2000, p. 31). 
But let it be said from the start that this status of argumentation theory is very 
problematic and disturbing for most professional philosophers, because philosophy, 
until recently in its millennial history, never limited itself to being or pretending to 
be merely a partial contribution to anything, but quite to the contrary, claimed for 
itself the status of a special and privileged knowledge that would be the foundation 
for all others and would be the true paradigm of rationality. Indeed, it is a very 
curious fact that even the “end” or the “death of philosophy” itself was announced, at 
a certain point in the past century, by philosophers who previously had followed a 
foundationalist path (like Quine, and others). It is in light of that status, as I will 
show later on, that we should understand Perelman and Toulmin’s conceptions of 
rhetoric and argumentation. Some contemporary theorists of argumentation (in the 
ambit of informal logic, for example), who began by being philosophers in their 
academic training, officially ceased to be so, and began claiming the precise 
condition of argumentation theorists, at times casting a suspicious eye on the 
philosophical approach to rhetoric and argumentation. I would say that the 
discovery and colonization of the continent of argumentation led them to put in 
parentheses, if not forget, the path that took them there.  
Now, whatever the “argumentation theory” itself may be is far from clear, not 
only in regard to the object of such theory and its transversality, but above all in 
regard to its (necessary) interdisciplinarity. Significantly, this last term/concept 
rarely appears when argumentation theorists delve into the nature and meaning of 
their own work. But it is interdisciplinarity, and not the multidisciplinarity I began 
by alluding to, that must inevitably be at the source of the very concept of 
"argumentation theory", considering that such a concept must have from the outset a 
systematic and even programmatic approach, as in fact the authors of Fundamentals 
of Argumentation Theory suggest when they refer to a “division of labor” or address 
the status and scope of logic in such division (van Eemeren et al., 1996, p. 5 ff.). 
Limiting myself to the aspects that are, without a doubt, the most relevant : there is, 
ideally at least, one, not various argumentation theories, to which we all contribute, 
and if there are no concepts and perspectives that are common to the various 
contributions that are susceptible of being elaborated on and developed, then there 
is no sense in our speaking of one single theory. How do each of these various 
contributions to the multidisciplinary field of argumentation effectively contribute 
to it ? How do these contributions relate to each other and intercross among 
themselves ? What greater or lesser primacy can (or should) be attributed to 
one/some of them in particular (as would be the case of philosophic contributions) ? 
These are (metatheoretical) questions that apparently have not been answered by 
argumentation theorists up to the present time. However, as I will attempt to 
suggest, they are essential questions; it is through the answer to these questions 
that the (new) status of philosophy within the framework of the so-called 
“argumentation theory” will be defined. 
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2. PHILOSOPHY AS THE (OLD) MATRIX OF ARGUMENTATION STUDIES 
 
That the questions I have just raised are of the greatest importance is something 
that can be immediately attested by the very history of rhetoric and argumentation 
from the second half of the 20th century to our days. Perelman and Toulmin were 
philosophers and saw philosophy precisely as being the fundamental matrix of 
argumentation studies (Ribeiro, 2009, pp. 34-37). This is to say right from the start 
that when they speak to us about rhetoric and argumentation, what they are talking 
about at first hand is philosophy, and essentially a philosophy that, as a whole, will 
be completely reduced to rhetoric and argumentation per se (Ribeiro, 2012a, p. 162 
ff.). In other words, what were, before them, different and separate fields of 
philosophy, such as metaphysics, the theory of knowledge or epistemology, ethics, 
political philosophy, for example, are now revolutionarily considered by them as 
domains of a single field or fundamental territory, which is precisely that of 
argumentation theory (see Perelman, 1969, p. 1 ff.; and Toulmin, 1958, p. 211 ff.). 
With them, this theory is no longer a simple discipline of philosophy among others, 
as was the case in the past; it is Philosophy itself, or all that ― in the context in which 
the works The New Rhetoric and The Uses of Argument were published, and which is, 
roughly speaking, that of the announced end of philosophy and the beginning of the 
so-called “post-modernity” ― it can and ought to be. This is about a genuine (though 
silent) revolution that, as I have suggested elsewhere (Ribeiro, 2012b, pp. 1-11), has 
no parallel in the history of western ideas since ancient Greece. 
As is the case, with the first author especially, they expressly acknowledge 
the multidisciplinarity of argumentation studies, but they never gave up the idea 
that philosophy ― or a new philosophy, following the revolution I alluded to ― was of 
necessity the path to its interdisciplinary framework (e.g., in regard to sociology or 
legal theory). In truth, in the sixties and seventies of the last century, but not 
without some surprise on the part of both, they were the first to confront the 
phenomenon of multidisciplinarity and the response of both to it was precisely that 
philosophy, as argumentation theory, would constitute this type of fundamental 
framework. Only philosophy, thus conceived, would provide the metatheoretical and 
systematic concepts that would make it possible to merge the different disciplinary 
contributions. In Perelman (1989), in an article with the significant title “Recherches 
interdisciplinaires sur l’argumentation” [Interdisciplinary investigations on 
argumentation], the author describes in the following manner that which he calls 
“the bases of argumentation theory”: 
 
An indispensable condition for the fecundity of interdisciplinary research is the 
existence of a theory that guarantees, once and for all, the terminology and the 
perspectives of the empirical or experimental studies. Without such a theory, each 
discipline runs the risk of examining different phenomena or, at least, phenomena 
that would be difficult to determine at what points they would correspond to those 
who study another discipline. (p. 383, my translation) 
 
In the perspective of this interdisciplinarity ― which only philosophy made 
possible ― it could even be conceived, ultimately, that philosophy itself―in the 
disciplinary and professional sense of the term ― would appear as a contribution to 
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argumentation theory. This is what Perelman (1989) tells us in regard to the notion 
of “reasonable”, which in his conception performs the metatheoretical and 
systematic function of an interdisciplinary concept: 
 
Psychology, psycho-pathology and philosophy could without a doubt help us to 
specifically determine the notion of reasonable, which is not conceived except in the 
context of an argumentation. What is a reasonable choice or decision ? What is it to 
rationalize or present as reasonable that which is not actually reasonable ? […] Can 
the notion of reasonable be expressed or defined in psychological, sociological or 
philosophical terms ? Do these various points of view intercross or overlap only 
partially ? (p. 393, my translation) 
 
In Toulmin, in turn, it is precisely the type of systematic concepts Perelman 
refers to (the well-known distinction between “rational” and “reasonable”), and 
which only philosophy offers, that confers intelligibility to his conception of rhetoric 
and argumentation practically from The Uses of Argument to Return to Reason. But 
his perspective, in contrast, as especially the last book mentioned shows, did not 
address the interdisciplinarity of argumentation theory so much as with the idea 
that, after the so-called "end of philosophy", this would take up again, in completely 
new terms, its universalist calling, presenting itself essentially as such 
(argumentation theory) (Toulmin, 2001, p. 12). In any case, for both of these 
authors, in our post-modern world philosophy would continue to be the basis of the 
foundations of rhetoric and argumentation, although in a form different from that 
which ― in the past and practically since the famous “tree of knowledge” devised by 
The Principles of Philosophy (Descartes, 1644/1985, pp. 186-187) ― it had been at 
the foundations of human knowledge in general. In this new context, if one can 
speak of any tree of this type, its trunk is precisely philosophy as argumentation 
theory, and its branches, those various multidisciplinary contributions to which I 
alluded.  
As philosopher I would say then that both Perelman and Toulmin would 
probably, not without strong reservations, subscribe to our current understanding of 
the concept of “argumentation theory”, which reduces it to multidisciplinarity 
without guaranteeing the necessary interdisciplinarity, and in the perspective of 
which philosophy will only make a contribution, among others and as valid and/or 
pertinent as they, to the field of that theory. The reason is that this conception, 
although placing argumentation at the top of the agenda (as both philosophers 
always defended), has as its backdrop the relativism to which the establishment of 
post-modernity led and, in particular, the collapse of the idea that there would be 
universal foundations for human knowledge in general, such as those that 
philosophy had previously provided. (It was such relativist position that J.-F. 
Lyotard (1979), in France, and R. Rorty (1979), in the USA, began to embrace in the 
seventies of the last century, but one which T. S. Kuhn (1962) and W. V. O. Quine 
(1953, 1969) had defended a decade earlier.) To the extent that the collapse I 
alluded to ― and through which came the “end (or death) of philosophy” ― implied 
putting philosophy into perspective, as a mere discipline among others in the 
academic curricula, and ―in the case of argumentation theory ― as a mere partial 
and limited approach to argumentation, our current understanding of the 
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multidisciplinarity of that theory would be ultimately unacceptable for both 
philosophers (Ribeiro, 2009, p. 35ff.). This is what Toulmin (2006), specifically, 
suggests to us in one of his last lectures: 
 
[…] So, I welcome this occasion for a creative and constructive discussion of all these 
issues : in particular, the relationship between what there is left for us under the 
heading of ‘philosophy’, and what you yourselves are engaged in doing under the 
heading of ‘the analysis of argumentation’. Are these purely distinct activities, or are 
they ones which blend into one another at the margin ? This for me is the central 
question with which we are, and will continue to be, concerned for the rest of this 
week, and I look forward very much to hearing what you have to say about it. (p. 29, 
emphasis mine) 
 
3. THE NEW ROLE OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY: A PLEA FOR 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
 
As I read it, Toulmin’s questions, although pertinent, were rhetorical when applied to 
his own perspective; there are not two distinct activities (philosophy and the 
"analysis of argumentation”), but only one: “the philosophical analysis of 
argumentation”, which is what — as he says along the line of Wittgenstein of 
Philosophical Investigations — “is left for us under the heading of ‘philosophy’” (see 
Ribeiro, 2012c). It is, in other words, the “rhetoric of philosophy” to which Toulmin 
alludes (2001, p. 12). As a matter of fact, as I have already observed above, 
everything indicates that Toulmin’s new concept of philosophy, after its “death”, did 
not necessarily involve interdisciplinarity regarding rhetoric (see 2001, pp. 138-
154, Ch. 9); but then, on the other hand and once again, it does not lead to 
multidisciplinarity and relativism. 
Now, there is no doubt that the positioning of Perelman and Toulmin in 
regard to the role of philosophy in argumentation studies is, from the outset, 
metaphilosophical; it constitutes, we could say, a half-way point between traditional 
foundationalism and the bankruptcy of philosophy, the purpose in both cases being 
to prevent the drift into relativism. The dominant paradigm is still, in one form or 
another, the Cartesian tree, interpreted in this way or the other. Personally, as a 
philosopher, I have the greatest sympathy for this type of positioning, which I have 
defended in recent years in various published works I have been referring to (see 
Ribeiro, 2012d). However, I find I am forced to confess that, today, it corresponds to 
a conception that is purely ideal, and, in practical terms, completely inconsequential. 
My explanation is not some metaphilosophical argument (such as Quine’s 
“ontological relativity”), but it is that the positioning referred to is not reconcilable 
or compatible with either the institutional reality of argumentation studies in 
western universities in general — where philosophy (logic included), in the face of 
the multidisciplinarity of argumentation teaching, has no prominent function or 
primacy — and, most of all, with that which, in conceptual and methodological 
terms, we can minimally or realistically demand from philosophy itself. Reason, or the 
“rational”, as well as that which, in contrast, we understand by relativism and which 
Perelman and Toulmin called, in some contexts, the “reasonable” (Perelman, 1979, 
pp. 117-123; Toulmin, 1990, pp. 198-201), are not merely intellectual concepts for 
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philosophical use, but ― as defended in Cosmopolis ― notions that are socially, 
culturally and politically incorporated in our institutions, customs and values, and 
are therefore essentially sociological phenomena. It is from this point of view that 
the association between multidisciplinarity and relativism must begin to be 
understood. The solution for the conflict between the two opposing fields (the 
“rational” and the “reasonable”) must, from the very start, come from a modest, 
pragmatic and feasible base, that makes argumentation theory viable as an 
interdisciplinary research program.  
What I would like to suggest is that it is possible to perceive Perelman’s 
interdisciplinarity in new terms, without turning it into a mere replacement concept 
for that of philosophy, as the case seems to be with him, and safeguarding as much 
as possible the “rhetoric of philosophy” Toulmin speaks to us about, without (in 
turn) our being reduced to multidisciplinarity and relativism, which is the way ― in 
contrast with his views ― we tend to interpret that concept today. The alternative 
implies completely renouncing the traditional scope of philosophy as a founding 
knowledge, and naturalizing it, by analogy with the naturalization of epistemology 
Quine speaks to us about in “Naturalized Epistemology” (1969, pp. 69-90) or with 
the naturalization of formal logic Ralph Johnson proposes (1996, pp. 76-86, Ch. 3). It 
was to such naturalization that, despite all the philosophical scruples coming from 
tradition (and which we should decidedly abandon today), both Perelman and 
(principally) Toulmin were already pointing towards in the last analysis. The 
philosopher, from this point of view, is on a par with the linguist, the sociologist, the 
legal theorist, etc., collaborating ― with his own skills ― in a common program that 
is supposed to be precisely that of an argumentation theory designed, from the start, 
in interdisciplinary terms. A good part of this interdisciplinarity had/has its origin, 
directly or indirectly in philosophy ; and the metatheoretical and systematic 
concepts of “rational” and “reasonable”, as the last works of those two authors 
suggest, continue to be philosophical tools that are indispensable for the purpose. 
Philosophy or “what is left of it”, as Toulmin would say, has everything to gain with 
this interdisciplinary participation in regard to a possible reformulation of the 
problems it deals with, or by expanding and probing deeper into those problems. 
Nevertheless, there will be no intellectual primacy on its part, nor, as a matter of fact 
and to the profound disappointment of traditional philosophers (among whom I 
include myself), any trunk common to the various branches of the (new) 
"argumentation tree". If any analogy makes sense, in this respect, we have to search 
for it, not in botany, but in the biological models of social organisation, and 
particularly in the ecological ones, as Toulmin proposed (1990, pp. 191-192).  
The interdisciplinary basis of argumentation theory is absolutely essential. 
We can do without it, and limit ourselves to multidisciplinarity; but, probably, 
twenty or thirty years from now we will be doing the same thing and in the same 
unconnected and uncoordinated way as today. The “field of argumentation”, as 
Perelman (1970) called it, is extraordinarily divided in relation to a whole set of 
metatheoretical and systematic questions that require interdisciplinary research, 
the most well-known and vexing one perhaps being the one dealing with the 
opposition between rhetoric and dialectic, between a descriptive perspective of 
argumentation and another that is essentially normative, which are still, for the 
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majority of approaches, conceptions that are irreducible and irreconcilable between 
one another (see Ribeiro, 2013; and van Eemeren, 2013). In the past, the role of 
formal logic in argumentation theory constituted a question of this sort. We need 
new interdisciplinary concepts such as those Perelman and Toulmin, in their time, 
conceived, to unify what we ambiguously and confusedly call "argumentation 
theory", the most significant examples of which are, as I have said, those of 
“rational” and “reasonable”. In the case of logic, for example, which from the first 
decades of the 20th century intended and claimed to be a paradigm of rationality, it 
was possible to achieve remarkable progress in the last twenty years, its 
contribution to the interdisciplinary field of argumentation theory being centred 
around the concept of formal validity. The old opposition between a formal logic and 
another that would be informal appears to have been overcome, and it is no longer 
an issue of real controversy. On the whole, the conclusion I come to (as philosopher) 
is that a good criterion for the acceptance of any particular theory in our field will 
be, then, the question of knowing whether or not it is interdisciplinary and/or has 
interdisciplinarity as its goal. 
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